How Successful Has the War on Drugs Been?
To answer this question, we fi rst ask, successful at achieving what goals? Th e current national drug control strategy is not primarily directed toward reducing the consequences of drug use, such as overdoses and HIV infection. Th e only explicit goals are related to reducing drug use itself.
In that regard, the drug war has had a mixed record, at least superfi cially. Th e percentage of the population reporting past-month use of some illicit drug declined by half between 1985 and 1992. Since then, however, drug use by that measure is up by about a third. Furthermore, current use of marijuana by teenagers increased substantially in the mid to late 1990s; in 2003, 21 percent of 12th-graders reported having used marijuana or hashish within the previous month.
We say "superfi cially" because trends in drug use are not determined solely by government policy. National trends are an aggregation of individual use patterns, which are infl uenced by a variety of factors.
Most users of any drug begin in their teen or young adult years. Th e strongest infl uence on initiation is typically use by friends or family, although prior alcohol and tobacco use, along with genetic factors, may also play a role. Use of marijuana is associated with subsequent use of harder drugs, although causal connections are not fi rmly established.
Th e course of drug use plays out diff erently in diff erent people. Most people who try a drug use it only experimentally or moderately. Some people, however, become dependent; the proportion varies by drug-23 percent for heroin, 17 percent for cocaine, 9 percent for marijuana. It is these dependent users who account for most of the burden on society. Th ey are the most likely to require health care services because of their drug use and are the primary source of drug market revenues because they use much longer and more intensively.
Because drug use is spread mainly through social contacts, patterns of drug use over time can have some of the characteristics of a contagious epidemic. Early users of a new drug lure other users, who lure still others. Th e burgeoning initiation rate falls abruptly as the drug's ill eff ects become apparent. Th at leaves many users who have become dependent during the upswing; they will gradually stop using over the course of many years.
Th e use of most drugs thus waxes and wanes, control policies notwithstanding. Th erefore, while specifi c use-reduction targets represent laudable objectives, they may be very easy or very diffi cult to achieve, depending on factors largely outside the government's control.
Why Hasn't the Drug War Been a Greater Success?
Given the uncertainties in arriving at any assessment, it is diffi cult to convincingly assert the success of U.S. drug policy to date. What factors within the government's control may have contributed to shortfalls? First, the balance among enforcement, treatment, and prevention has probably not been optimal. Th e drug control budget goes mostly to enforcement, and some studies suggest that a marginal reallocation toward treating heavy drug users would have been more eff ective in reducing drug consumption and drug-related crime and other consequences. Enforcement is problematic when used against well-established drug markets because they are supplied by diff use networks and arrested sellers are easily replaced. Treatment also has its limitations, however. It cannot solve immediate problems, like an increase in drug sales down the street, the way enforcement can. Its benefi ts accumulate slowly. However, treatment is cheaper than enforcement and attacks demand directly; it also does not have the ill eff ects of enforcement, e.g., racial disparities in who bears enforcement's burden. It is less clear that the government would have achieved dramatically more by shifting funds from enforcement to prevention. As with treatment, the benefi ts of prevention accumulate slowly, and even model programs appear to be cost-eff ective in no small part because they are relatively cheap, not because they eliminate more than a modest fraction of use. School-based prevention programs do, however, have benefi cial eff ects on use of other substances (alcohol and tobacco) and on other behaviors.
Second, the balance among enforcement strategies may not have been optimal. RAND researchers have shown that cocaine consumption might have been further reduced if some of the money spent trying to control cocaine in source countries or in transit had been spent on enforcement within the United States. Also, long sentences for sellers in the United States might have been focused more eff ectively on the most culpable distributors.
How Should U.S. Drug Policies Evolve?
While the Occasional Paper is intended as a source of information and analysis, not a detailed set of policy prescriptions, the authors draw some broad principles out of their analytic perspective.
• Manage this long-term problem for the long term. Th e drug problem is not going away. It must be managed so as to limit the number of people who use, the frequency or duration of their use, and the damage they do to themselves and others, together with the damage resulting from policy choices.
• Use all policy levers. All approaches should be considered in formulating the right policy mix for the situation. In particular, the mix of control strategies should be timed to the epidemic cycle. In early epidemic stages, dealers are not numerous and enforcement may be eff ective. In the later stages, when the burdens of heavy use are taking a social toll, and when the market has become too large and diff use for enforcement to disrupt, the balance should shift to treatment. Prevention of the next epidemic should always be under way.
• Draw strength from cross-state variations in drug policy.
Th e federal government has sought to rein in those few states whose policies have deviated from its own. Th e government might instead tolerate and seek to learn from state variations that do not seriously undermine the intent of the federal strategy.
• Press for a more dispassionate debate. Discussion of policy alternatives has been marked by polemics from both sides. Th e public should demand that the parties to the debate attend to the apparent or likely eff ects of current or alternative policies. Th ey should demand as much information on eff ects as they are now getting on the policies' consistency with the moral scruples of the discussants.
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